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 1 
Description 
 
Matthew Watson reviews the literature on international capital mobility to conclude that 
ideas about global capital market integration have an independent causal impact on 
political outcomes which extends beyond that which can be attributed to the extent of 
their actual integration. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The debate about the scope of feasible policy-making in an era of globalisation continues 
to be set within the context of an assumption that national capital markets are now 
perfectly integrated at the international level.  However, the empirical evidence on 
international capital mobility contradicts such an assumption.  As a consequence, a 
significant puzzle remains.  Why is it, in a world in which the observed pattern of capital 
flows is indicative of a far from globalised reality, that public policy continues to be 
constructed in line with more extreme variants of the globalisation hypothesis?  I attempt 
to solve this puzzle by arguing that ideas about global capital market integration have an 
independent causal impact on political outcomes which extends beyond that which can be 
attributed to the extent of their actual integration. 
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Introduction 
 
By now, the conventional wisdom of globalisation is well-known.  It begins with the 
assertion that a heightened incidence of international capital mobility has been sufficient 
to place all governments in an effective political straitjacket.  International financial 
markets are assumed to tolerate only the most strictly orthodox monetary policy; 
governments which refuse to be bound by these new structural realities face ‘punishment 
beatings’ administered by the markets in the form of mass capital flight.  This story is 
now so familiar that we are often told that it needs no repetition.2
 
 
In this article, however, I take issue with such a conclusion.  I suggest that its very 
familiarity is itself a source of analytical interest.  Such is the frequency with which 
public policy-makers appeal to these new ‘structural realities’ as an automatic guide for 
policy that it is possible that the conventional wisdom of globalisation has itself become a 
conditioning influence on policy.  In other words, we should be aware that ideas about 
globalisation may have an independent causal impact on political outcomes over and 
above that which can be attributed to globalisation per se.  I attempt to illustrate this 
argument in the pages which follow through reference to the debate in the economics 
literature about international capital mobility.  In the absence of the assumption of perfect 
capital mobility, the conventional wisdom of globalisation immediately begins to look 
questionable.3  Yet, existing empirical evidence suggests that it may be no more than 
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that: an assumption.  We are therefore left with having to explain why political outcomes 
continue to be oriented in line with a conventional wisdom of globalisation which 
evidential data on international capital mobility suggests is an exaggeration of a far less 
globalised reality.  The explanation I forward here focuses on the possibility that the 
conventional wisdom has itself assumed causal status in the production of outcomes 
consistent with the globalisation hypothesis. 
 
In order to render what I am arguing as clear as possible, let me digress briefly to state 
what I am not arguing.  In no sense do I subscribe to the claim that it is merely ideas 
which are driving the politics and, hence, the economics of globalisation.  Contemporary 
processes of structural socio-economic change extend beyond mere ideological facades, 
being rooted in an on-going re-definition of the material properties of the economic base.  
Whilst an unquestioning faith in the ‘new economy’ is itself to be challenged (see Watson 
and Hay 2000), recent technological developments have clearly impacted both on the 
way in which we conceive of economic relations and also on the underlying ‘reality’ on 
which such conceptions are based. 
 
The limit of my argument in the pages which follow is to suggest that claims relating to 
the ‘material reality’ of globalisation often run ahead of the structural economic change 
which they purport to reflect.4  Nowhere does this mismatch between rhetoric and reality 
have more significant political implications, I suggest, than in relation to the assumption 
that the international economy now boasts a single capital market.  It is on the basis of 
this assumption that we hear frequent claims about the political constraints associated 
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with financial globalisation, so clear is the presumed link between a ‘borderless’ capital 
market and the mere threat of destabilising capital flows.  That threat has often been 
sufficient in itself to foster the view that those operating within international financial 
markets now hold an effective veto over government economic policy.5
 
  My aim in this 
article, however, is to question the extent to which the means through which this veto is 
imposed – that is, a perfectly integrated global capital market – actually exists in practice.  
This is not to claim that the world looks very much as it always has; nor is it to deny that 
the rhetoric of a perfectly integrated global capital market has become a powerful 
political tool.  It is merely to make the academic case that analyses of the international 
economy must treat the issue of financial globalisation as an open empirical question 
rather than as an accepted fact. 
 
 
 
The ‘Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle’ and the Debate on International Capital Mobility 
 
Economists tended to be rather quicker than political scientists in identifying the 
‘obvious’ implications of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s.  
With institutionalised capital controls rapidly in retreat, it was thought to be only a matter 
of time before the world came to resemble the models of perfect capital mobility which 
by then had already dominated international economics textbooks for many years.  
Indeed, in accepting the assumption of frictionless markets in order to render economic 
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theory more ‘scientific’, it could be argued that an extreme assumption of globalisation 
has long been a precondition for most orthodox econometric modelling.6
 
  Set within such 
a context, we should not be surprised at the palpable sense of shock with which the 
economics profession received the publication of contradictory evidence on the extent of 
international capital mobility in a paper by Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka in 1980 
(Feldstein & Horioka 1980). 
Feldstein and Horioka found that a strong and statistically significant correlation was 
observed when regression analysis techniques were used to determine the relationship 
between the rate of domestic savings and the rate of domestic investment.  They 
interpreted this finding as evidence that capital markets were anything other than 
perfectly integrated at the international level.  If we lived in a world of perfect capital 
mobility, they argued, domestic investors would compete for funds from a single world 
savings pool and the correlation between domestic saving and domestic investment 
would disappear.  As it was, its persistence implies that capital is far less mobile across 
national borders than is generally believed. 
 
The economics profession was provoked into response: both because the Feldstein-
Horioka coefficients were effectively an accusation that the whole of the discipline had 
been working on the basis of misplaced principles for many years; and also because the 
results appeared counter-intuitive in a policy-making environment which had recently 
been dominated by high-profile government attempts to dismantle existing systems of 
capital controls.  The response took three forms. 
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•  Firstly, there were those who claimed that the persistence of high savings-
investment correlations should not necessarily be overly traumatising for the 
economics profession, as economists need not be bound by a lay definition of 
‘realism’ in assessing what passed the standard of ‘good economics’.  In the 
search for formal theoretical rigour and subsequent scientific status for their 
theories, economists have tended to concentrate on deriving abstract 
principles of market behaviour rather than focusing on the empirical content 
of actual market outcomes.  On the basis of this set of priorities, it was 
suggested that Feldstein and Horioka’s conclusions could be rejected, even 
though they were grounded in an empirical investigation of the real world, 
simply because they violated the abstract principles on which modern 
econometric analyses of the market are based. 
•  Secondly, there were those who attacked the Feldstein-Horioka 
methodology, attributing the strength of their coefficients simply to bad 
econometrics. 
•  Thirdly, there were those who attacked the link that Feldstein and Horioka 
drew between high savings-investment coefficients and imperfect capital 
mobility, arguing that evidence for the former does not necessarily imply 
evidence for the latter. 
 
It was only on the basis of the second and third criticisms that an actual debate could be 
initiated.  Moreover, the second line of criticism can be dismissed relatively quickly.  The 
most influential reviews of the literature on the ‘Feldstein-Horioka puzzle’ may well 
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describe continuing high savings-investment correlations as “anomalous” (Bayoumi 
1997: 4); as “upsetting” for the conventional wisdom of perfectly integrated capital 
markets (Frankel 1991: 227); and as “baffling” for the economics profession (Dornbusch 
1991: 220; Sarno & Taylor 1998: 17).  At the same time, however, such correlations have 
also been “confirmed by many subsequent studies” (Dooley, Frankel & Mathieson 1987: 
503) as “remarkably consistent” (Glick & Rogoff 1995: 159) and as “extremely robust” 
(Sarno & Taylor 1998: 20; Baxter & Crucini 1993: 417).  Whatever the perceived 
methodological weaknesses of Feldstein and Horioka’s study, then, the result has been 
replicated by other authors not similarly accused.  As Rudiger Dornbusch concludes, the 
methodological critique of the Feldstein-Horioka co-efficients has “run out of steam; the 
fact [of high savings-investment correlations] is sturdy and the debate has turned to the 
interpretation” (Dornbusch 1991: 222).  In other words, the empirical results may well be 
profoundly disturbing for assumptions of perfect international capital mobility, but that 
does not necessarily make them wrong. 
 
Without doubt, the most perceptive and the most interesting interventions into the debate 
on the ‘Feldstein-Horioka puzzle’ concern the ability to use savings-investment 
correlations to measure the extent of international capital mobility.  The aim of much of 
the literature which follows in the Feldstein-Horioka tradition has been to show that 
persistent savings-investment correlations do not necessarily violate the assumption of 
perfectly integrated capital markets.  The initial test of capital market integration 
introduced in the famous Economic Journal article is now generally believed to be too 
exacting.  Indeed, in a recent review of the literature, Mathias Hoffmann has gone as far 
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as to describe the Feldstein-Horioka correlations as “uninformative” in relation to the true 
nature of international capital mobility (Hoffmann 1998: 12). 
 
For the savings-investment coefficient to approach zero, as the initial test suggested 
would be logically implied in a world of perfect capital mobility, three separate 
conditions would have to hold (on which point, see Dooley, Frankel & Mathieson 1987: 
505).  Firstly, a country’s investment rate would have to depend solely on domestic 
interest rates.  Secondly, domestic interest rates would have to converge around a world 
norm.  Thirdly, there could be no difference between countries in the expected rate of 
return relevant for investment and saving decisions.  On their own, each of these three 
conditions is likely to correspond more closely to a textbook ideal-type than to the world 
of everyday experience.  Put together, they effectively rule out the possibility of 
‘discovering’ an international economic context of perfect capital mobility.  If any of the 
three conditions fails to hold - and, in practice, it is necessary to ask why we would 
presume that any of the three conditions would be likely to hold - then there is no reason 
for the correlation between domestic savings and domestic investment to disappear.  Such 
is the stringency of economic tests for perfect capital mobility, that economists have 
identified an increasing reluctance amongst their colleagues to appeal to the image of 
perfectly integrated capital markets7
 
 (Dooley, Frankel & Mathieson 1987: 503). 
This is surely significant for the type of research which political scientists should be 
seeking to undertake in relation to globalisation.  At the very least, it suggests that we can 
add a political dimension to the international capital mobility ‘puzzle’ that Feldstein and 
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Horioka set their fellow economists.  For, this increasing reluctance of economists to 
assume a world of perfect capital mobility has occurred within a wider political context in 
which the very same assumption has increasingly come to be adopted as a matter of 
course.  In the public discourse of politicians and political scientists alike, increased 
mobility options have become the most frequently cited explanation of the policy-making 
dilemmas associated with globalisation (for a commentary on which, see Berger & Dore 
1996; Kofman & Youngs 1996; Mittelman 1996; Hirst & Thompson 1999).  It is the 
ability of capital to locate wherever in the world competitive advantage dictates which is 
assumed to explain why it can effectively escape national regimes of regulation (see, for 
example Przeworski & Wallerstein 1988; Scharpf 1991; Streeck 1991). 
 
Yet, is there sufficient evidence to sustain such an explanation?  Even when the 
conditions of the Feldstein-Horioka tests for capital mobility are relaxed, the evidence 
continues to be much more ambiguous than is implied by the certainty with which 
assumptions of perfectly integrated capital markets are made in public discourse. 
 
According to Tamim Bayoumi, contemporary public policy-makers generally refer to 
microeconomic tests of capital mobility (looking at access to international capital markets 
through evidence of interest rate differentials) rather than macroeconomic tests (looking 
at net capital flows in relation to information about fundamentals).  Macroeconomic tests 
tend to be overlooked, because almost without exception they “support the notion that 
capital flows are abnormally low” (Bayoumi 1997: 20).  Quite clearly, such results fit 
poorly with a wider discursive context in which the image of a single world capital 
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market is continuously invoked as perhaps the defining symbol of economic 
globalisation.8
 
  Yet, even the microeconomic tests, which public policy-makers prefer 
because they imply a closer correspondence between rhetoric and reality, in no way prove 
that we live in a world of perfect capital mobility.  It is the assumption of instantaneous 
adjustment in financial prices triggered by perfectly integrated capital markets which 
animates much of the public discourse about globalisation (on which point, see Hay, 
Watson & Wincott 1999: 4).  However, on the basis of the existing evidence of limited 
international capital mobility, it is precisely such an assumption which Jeffrey Frankel 
insists can be “easily rejected” (Frankel 1991: 236). 
Under conditions of instantaneous adjustment, all real interest rate differentials would 
automatically be negated.  As with the evidence on savings-investment correlations, 
however, the evidence on real interest parity fails to tell an unambiguous story of 
international capital mobility commensurate with the globalisation hypothesis.9
 
  The 
empirical data shows that flows of highly liquid capital move swiftly to arbitrage short-
term international yield differences - much as Feldstein and Horioka demonstrated as 
long ago as their original 1980 paper (Feldstein & Horioka 1980: 315).  Yet, it also 
reveals a persistence in covered interest rate differentials across space and, as such, quite 
significant barriers to long-term capital mobility (Frankel 1992: 199).  Indeed, such 
barriers would appear to be structural in nature; at least as long as any combination of 
transaction costs, information costs, capital controls, asymmetric tax regimes and default 
risk continues to shape the overall pattern of net capital flows. 
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Given that these have been enduring financial market features in both the Bretton Woods 
and the post-Bretton Woods eras, it is perhaps unsurprising that measures of international 
capital mobility, as implied by savings-investment correlations, are not markedly 
different between the two periods (see Obstfeld 1995).  Our sense of surprise may only be 
activated if we reconsider this finding within the context of the dominant discourse of 
globalisation.  For, it now tends to be assumed with a sense of unquestioning certainty 
that the dissolution of the Bretton Woods system represents nothing less than a paradigm 
shift in feasible exit options for capital.  It is often unclear in public discourse whether 
this represents a paradigm shift in policy influencing such outcomes, or a paradigm shift 
in the ideas informing such flows, or both; however, a sense of paradigm shift is 
nonetheless persistently invoked.  A conventional wisdom now energises much of the 
public debate on these issues, and it states that the world of limited capital market 
integration institutionalised through the Bretton Woods agreements has been left behind 
for good.  Yet, what are we to make of claims for globalisation, in circumstances in 
which we have evidence that OECD countries have moved further from real interest 
parity in an era of supposedly globally integrated capital markets than they did in an era 
in which capital market integration was institutionally proscribed (Frankel 1991: 231)?  
Equally, what are we to make of claims about the qualitative novelty of globalisation in 
light of the following evidence?  Empirical tests which demonstrate limited international 
capital mobility in the Bretton Woods era also demonstrate limited international capital 
mobility in the post-Bretton Woods era (see, for instance, Feldstein & Bacchetta 1991: 
206; Frankel 1991: 238); whilst empirical tests which relax the stringency of their initial 
assumptions in order to demonstrate a higher degree of mobility in the current era also 
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reveal a substantially higher degree of mobility under Bretton Woods (see, for instance, 
Hoffmann 1998: 24). 
 
 
 
 
Ideas About Globalisation as Independent Causal Influence 
 
In an important sense, then, it does not seem to matter which way round we read the 
evidence.  Whether we choose to accept the conclusion of limited and stable capital 
mobility as we move into the post-Bretton Woods era, or whether we choose to accept the 
conclusion of high but stable capital mobility which began in the Bretton Woods era, the 
assumption of novelty in current circumstances is difficult to sustain.  In the absence of 
evidence that we have experienced qualitative change in international capital mobility, 
we would appear to have little basis for following the conventional wisdom of 
globalisation by arguing that we have experienced similar qualitative change in the 
parameters of the politically possible.  As Dooley et al conclude, in strict analytical 
terms, the conventional wisdom is “of limited value” (Dooley, Frankel & Mathieson 
1987: 523). 
 
However, it is my argument here that the impact of the conventional wisdom extends 
beyond its analytical value.  Even a cursory reading of the literature which follows in the 
Feldstein-Horioka tradition is sufficient to raise serious questions about the analytical 
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‘work’ which the conventional wisdom can perform.  Yet, the same can in no way be said 
about the political ‘work’ which is enabled by the appropriation of that wisdom. 
 
The existence of evidence which is consistent with the globalisation hypothesis is not 
necessarily confirmation of the validity of that hypothesis.  On first reading, this would 
appear to be a rather abstract claim, so it is perhaps worth exploring in a little more detail.  
Put simply, governments need only act on the perception of the structural constraints 
imposed by globalising tendencies in order to turn the globalisation hypothesis into a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.  At no stage does globalisation have to come complete with an 
actual logic of political necessity for the effects of such a logic to become apparent.  So 
long as governments act in a manner consistent with the globalisation hypothesis,10
 
 we 
will be able to observe an increase in the number of outcomes which seemingly serve to 
‘confirm’ that hypothesis, irrespective of whether or not it was true in the first place. 
Let me state this even more simply.  Whenever global economic relations are said to 
contain an in-built political logic of no alternative, international financial flows are 
introduced as the mechanism which polices the parameters of the politically possible 
(O’Brien 1992; Kobrin 1997).  Governments may well attempt to assert their policy-
making autonomy by challenging globalisation’s perceived political logic of no 
alternative.  But, it is argued that they now do so fully sensitised to the consequences of 
their actions: namely, that whatever short-term political gains they enjoy by ignoring the 
structural realities of globalisation are likely to be dwarfed by long-term economic losses 
as the international financial markets take their retribution in the form of mass capital 
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flight.  Of course, the evidence previously introduced in this article contradicts such a 
view.  Net flows of long-term capital across space simply do not correspond to the pattern 
predicted by the globalisation hypothesis.  However, the mere spectre of expanded exit 
opportunities has often been sufficient to ensure that governments engage in behaviour 
which conforms to globalisation’s perceived political logic of no alternative (Piven 1995: 
111).  Existing national tax regimes are thought to be especially vulnerable in this respect 
(although, see Swank 1998); the international financial markets are thought to take a dim 
view of governments who engage in overly-active fiscal policy.  However, as the 
empirical research undertaken in the Feldstein-Horioka tradition reveals, the actual flow 
of capital away from market-replacing policy regimes, and towards market-conforming 
policy regimes, is not as pronounced as the conventional wisdom implies.  Yet, the 
general acceptance of the idea that exit threats are credible can be seen to lead to exactly 
the same policy outcomes as those predicted by the conventional wisdom. 
 
The tendency towards central bank independence offers a clear practical example of such 
a process.  The appeal to globalising necessities in order to rationalise such a tendency 
has become a common element of public policy discourse.  International financial 
markets, it is argued, will not now tolerate anything other than the strictest 
macroeconomic orthodoxy.  The threat of capital flight consequently conditions the 
search for a new institutional bargain which militates against the pursuit of more 
heterodox monetary policies.  Typically, that search has ended with governments making 
moves to delegate policy-making responsibilities to independent central banks, and 
receiving the assent of international financial institutions for doing so. 
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Given that central bankers tend to agree both on preferred policy goals and the preferred 
means to achieve such goals, this has resulted not only in convergence in the institutions 
of monetary policy-making but also in convergence in monetary policy itself.  This 
represents a significant shift compared to previous practice.  Before the move to 
institutionalise central bank independence, the observed pattern of net capital flows 
would seem to imply that international financial markets have been placated by policies 
crafted from a range of often mutually incompatible macroeconomic stances.  In other 
words, the actual history of capital flows suggests that financial markets operate along 
rather more complex lines than the uni-dimensional logic which dominates the 
conventional wisdom of globalisation.  Yet, it has been precisely this image of a single 
systemic logic to market action which has been used to justify not only the transfer of 
policy-making initiative to central banks, but also the appointment of specifically 
conservative central bankers to oversee the policy-making role.  What is more, these new 
institutional arrangements for the conduct of monetary policy threaten to create precisely 
the uni-dimensional logic to market action to which they are supposed to be a response.  
For, in circumstances in which governments are increasingly asking the markets to judge 
them on the basis of convergent macroeconomic policies, capital flows are likely to 
become increasingly sensitive to the strictness of a government’s macroeconomic 
orthodoxy. 
 
Moreover, at the same time as governments are facilitating the imposition of a uni-
dimensional logic to market action through the reconstitution of monetary policy 
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domestically, they are also entering into international agreements designed specifically to 
ease restrictions on the flow of capital.  The single capital market rules enshrined in the 
Maastricht Treaty are but the clearest example of the way in which conditions for free 
capital mobility are being institutionalised at the regional level.  Once more, the idea that 
financial markets were already integrated into a single global structure seems to have 
been the cue for setting in motion a self-perpetuating sequence of events which has led 
ever closer to the creation of just such a structure.  Governments which have articulated 
the ‘necessity’ of a policy response to the structural power enjoyed by international 
financial markets have tended to do so by arguing for the introduction of further financial 
liberalisation.  Yet, this has merely had the effect of increasing the structural power of 
international financial markets still further and, as a consequence, providing a context in 
which the articulation of the ‘necessity’ of further financial liberalisation becomes still 
more resonant.  Despite the consequences of several iterations of such a process, 
international capital mobility remains less pronounced today than is implied in the 
conventional wisdom of globalisation.  Of course, this is not to say that several more 
iterations of that process will not eventually produce a world which corresponds to that 
envisaged in the conventional wisdom.  Equally, however, if that world is to be created at 
some future point in time, it is clear that it will not be created solely under the influence 
of globalisation per se.  We must also leave open the possibility that ideas about 
globalisation may have an independent causal impact leading to the production of 
‘globalising outcomes’. 
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Of course, savings-investment correlations of the type which feature in Feldstein and 
Horioka’s initial article provide only one measure of capital mobility.  As such, even in 
circumstances in which we can identify relatively constant savings-investment 
correlations over time, this delivers only a partial insight into the overall structure of 
international finance.  It would stretch the bounds of credibility to claim that the realm of 
international finance has experienced anything other than significant processes of 
structural change in recent years.  However, in no way does this confirm that the nature 
of such change is necessarily consistent with the assumption of globalisation, nor with the 
assumption of perfect capital mobility for which the Feldstein-Horioka methodology 
tests.  ‘Change’ and ‘globalisation’ are by no means synonymous. 
 
It is inconceivable that recent structural changes within international financial markets 
have not come complete with new constraints on policy-making autonomy.  It has not 
been my intention in the preceding pages to question the existence of such change.  
Continued technological developments have re-defined the relationship between investors 
in a way which threatens to crowd out public regulators from the realm of private finance 
(see Watson 1999; Davies 2000).  Along with these significant changes that the internet 
in particular is likely to bring to the microstructure of all financial markets, the 
macrostructure of both the retail banking and stock markets is currently being 
qualitatively recast amidst a wave of international mergers.  However, as yet, such 
changes have failed to create a truly global market in footloose savings, as the persistence 
of high Feldstein-Horioka correlations attests. 
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Thus, whilst it would be wrong to challenge the existence of recent processes of structural 
change within international financial markets, it is necessary to question whether the 
nature of that change automatically corresponds to the assumption of globalisation.  By 
following the Feldstein-Horioka tradition, it has only been possible to present information 
on the aggregate levels of savings and investment within an economy.11
 
  A 
comprehensive survey of the changing structure of the markets which become the 
channels for savings and investment activity will have to wait for another time.  On the 
basis of Feldstein-Horioka coefficients alone, the most interesting avenue for future 
research would seem to be the strategic use which governments make of the image of 
‘globalisation’ in circumstances in which change is not necessarily globalising in nature. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, I have argued that it is important that we add a political dimension to the 
traditional understanding of the ‘Feldstein-Horioka puzzle’.  As Tamim Bayoumi argues, 
on a purely economic reading of the ‘puzzle’, we are left with no choice but to conclude 
that “the global economy appears to have some troubles at border crossings” (Bayoumi 
1997: 71).  Any critical evaluation of the economics literature which follows the 
Feldstein-Horioka tradition is likely to lead to the same conclusion.  Even The Economist, 
never slow to push the normative agenda of globalisation, has felt compelled to concede 
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that, “despite all the hyperbole, a global capital market does not yet exist” (The 
Economist, 25.10.97: 139).  Notwithstanding this conclusion, however, we are still left 
with a rather different problem to explain.  Why is it, in this world in which capital 
continues to experience ‘troubled border crossings’, that public discourse consistently 
invokes the image of a truly ‘borderless world’ in its appeal to the idea of globalisation?12
 
 
So long as this political dimension to the ‘Feldstein-Horioka puzzle’ persists, ideas about 
globalisation are themselves likely to have a causal impact on political outcomes 
extending beyond that which can be attributed to globalisation per se.  Public policy-
makers have been quick to enlist the conventional wisdom of globalisation as an effective 
‘default’ explanation for their more recent political interventions.  Yet, as the empirical 
evidence reviewed in this article suggests, political scientists should be equally quick to 
resist doing the same.  In no sense is this to deny that the international economy 
continues to pass through a moment of significant structural change; clearly, it does.  But, 
it is to appeal to those researchers working on the international dynamics of 
contemporary economic change to recognise other potential causal tendencies 
underpinning that change in addition to globalisation.  The empirical evidence on 
international capital mobility simply does not provide a basis for political scientists to 
add their voice to the long list of those who publicly articulate an uncritical acceptance of 
the conventional wisdom of globalisation. 
 
Of course, there is no reason why political scientists should necessarily fall into such a 
trap.  Much work already exists, originating in institutional economics (Hodgson 1988; 
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Helleiner 1994) and historical sociology (Hall 1989; O’Neill 1998), which refutes the 
conception of markets to be found in the conventional wisdom of globalisation.  This 
work can usefully be appropriated in order to dismiss the assumption that market 
exchange ever operates as a frictionless process governed purely by abstract economic 
laws.  The task of future scholarship on globalisation must be twofold.  Perhaps most 
obviously, it is necessary to focus on the way in which contemporary patterns of market 
exchange in the realm of international finance have been generated by iterative changes 
in public governance which continue to fall well short of the standard of perfect 
competition and which, as a result, have produced a market environment which is 
significantly less than global in orientation.  Equally, however, it is also necessary to 
chart the way in which the new public management of international finance has been 
rationalised and, on occasions, even driven, by the idea that ‘natural’ market dynamics 
had already integrated national capital markets into a single global structure. 
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